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To provide a rigorous analysis of monetary policy in the face of financial instability, 
we extend the standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to include a 
financial system. Our simulations suggest that if financial instability affects output 
and inflation with a lag, and if the central bank has privileged information about 
credit risk, monetary policy responding instantly to increased credit risk can trade off 
more output and inflation instability today for a faster return to the trend than a policy 
that follows the simple Taylor rule. This augmented rule leads in some 
parameterizations to improved outcomes in terms of long-term welfare, however, the 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Standard monetary policy rules are good for basic understanding of monetary policy decisions, 
but they also leave something to be desired. In broad literature surveys, simple instrument rules 
explain at most two thirds of the empirical variance of interest rate changes. The unexplained part 
includes discretionary policymaking, but it can also be seen as measure of our ignorance about the 
actual rules used by policy makers. 
An important element missing from the simple monetary policy rules is the central bank response 
to financial instability. For some time now, central banks have recognized the importance of 
timely response to financial instability, and have devoted substantial resources to monitoring 
financial sector soundness, with the help of confidential supervisory and payment system data. 
The liquidity injections and other actions by the major central banks during the 2007–08 global 
financial crisis have brought the response of central banks to financial instability to the spotlight.  
Despite the macroeconomic importance of financial stability, the monetary policy literature has 
largely omitted financial sector soundness from central bank response functions. To fill this gap, 
we (i) integrate into the standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model a financial system 
and firms that require external financing, and (ii) introduce a forward-looking element into the 
basic Taylor rule. Under this augmented policy rule, the central bank monitors the financial 
system, responding to deterioration in the financial system balance sheet with instant monetary 
loosening.  
We proceed to simulate the behavior of the economy and the central bank under various shocks, 
including a shock to financial stability. Our simulation results show that if the central bank 
responds to a deterioration in financial system credit risk by a monetary easing, such a 
“preemptive strike” stabilizes inflation and output better in the short run than a simple Taylor rule. 
In other words, well-informed, forward-looking discretionary policymaking, which takes into 
account the default rate of financial intermediaries’ lending projects and its impact on future 
output developments, is preferable to backward-looking rules. These findings provide a model-
based justification for the existing central bank practice of intervening against a background of 
financial shocks. However, the findings also indicate that after the initial output stabilization, the 
economy is faced with more output volatility later and higher inflation as compared to standard 
rules.  
The long-run welfare impact depends on the parameterization of the model and the type of 
welfare function. However, the long-run welfare benefits of the augmented rules appear to be 
negligible, and this result is robust with respect to different welfare functions. Moreover, 
monetary easing is unlikely to work in highly open economies with either fixed exchange rates or 
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1. Introduction 
Standard monetary policy rules are good for basic understanding of monetary policy decisions. As 
noted by Jannet Yellen, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, a reaction 
function in which the real funds rate changes by roughly equal amounts in response to deviations 
of inflation from a target of 2 percent and to deviations of actual from potential output “describes 
reasonably well” what the U.S. Fed has done since 1986.
2 However, such basic rules also leave 
something to be desired. In broad literature surveys, simple instrument rules at most explain two 
thirds of the empirical variance of interest rate changes (Svensson, 2003). The unexplained part 
includes discretionary policymaking, but it can also be seen as measure of our ignorance about the 
actual rules used by policy makers. 
An important element missing from the simple rules is the central bank response to episodes of 
financial instability. For some time now, central banks have recognized the importance of timely 
response to financial instability, and have devoted substantial resources to monitoring financial 
stability, often with the help of confidential supervisory data. The liquidity injections by the major 
central banks during the 2007–08 global financial turbulence have brought these issues to the 
spotlight.  
How should changes in financial sector soundness affect monetary policy? In this paper, we 
answer this question by addressing two simplifications in the standard monetary dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model: (i) the omission of a financial system, and (ii) the 
omission of forward-looking variables in the policy (Taylor) rule. In our model, the central bank 
has privileged information about the health of the financial system, a reasonable assumption given 
that many central banks are involved in financial sector supervision, and even those that are not 
have access to a wealth of payment system data. Individual financial institutions would normally 
have better information about their financial health and the financial health of their clients, but 
they would not have such information at the systemic level. In contrast, the central bank’s unique 
role in the payment system and usually also in prudential supervision gives it access to superior 
information about the health of the financial system as a whole (e.g., Padoa-Schioppa, 2002).  
Our simulation results show that if the central bank responds to a deterioration in financial system 
credit risk by a monetary easing, then such a “preemptive strike” stabilizes inflation and output 
better in the short run than the simple Taylor rule that is usually assumed in the DSGE model. In 
other words, well-informed, forward-looking discretionary policymaking, which takes into 
account the default rate of financial intermediaries’ lending projects and its impact on future 
output developments, is preferable to backward-looking rules. However, after the initial output 
stabilization, the economy is faced with more output volatility later and higher inflation as 
compared to standard rules. 
The findings provide model justification for the existing central bank practice of intervening 
against a background of financial shocks—the simple rule is an inaccurate description of central 
bank behavior, underestimating actual policy changes in such situations. The central bank 
following our augmented policy rule trades off more output and inflation instability today for a 
faster return to the trend path tomorrow. The simulations also suggest limits to the use of 
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monetary policy instruments for financial system stabilization. The central bank seems capable 
only of a faster reaction to the financial instability shock, keeping the nature of monetary policy 
unchanged, and long-run consumption volatility remains practically identical under both rules. 
Moreover, monetary easing is unlikely to work in highly open economies with either fixed 
exchange rates or a strong exchange rate channel of monetary transmission. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the link between monetary 
policy and financial sector stability. In Section 3, we build a DSGE model with financial 
intermediaries. In Section 4, we calibrate the model on U.S. data and present simulations for a 
range of policy-relevant shocks, analyzing an augmented policy rule. In Section 5, we present 
some robustness checks. Section 6 discusses possible extensions of the model. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Determining Monetary Policy Under Financial Instability 
In a widely quoted paper, Taylor (1993) suggested that monetary policy could be explained by a 
rule that links the central bank’s policy rate to contemporaneous deviations of inflation and output 
from their target and potential levels, respectively. Since then, the “Taylor rule” has become a tool 
of choice for those needing to model central bank responses to macroeconomic developments. 
However, it remains doubtful whether the simple, backward-looking rule is an accurate 
description of central banks’ behavior. 
2.1 The Absence of Financial Sector Soundness in Monetary Policy Models 
The financial system is absent from the standard monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model and from simpler models built for policy purposes. In fact, a typical model used by 
an inflation-targeting central bank does not consider banks at all, and its policy rule ignores the 
health of the financial system. Such an omission is puzzling, given that many central banks have 
financial stability as a policy goal (Crockett, 1997) and that central bankers devote considerable 
time to discussing and analyzing the financial sector. This attention has been illustrated by the 
proliferation of financial stability reports over the last decade (Čihák, 2006), and, more recently, 
by the aggressive policy response of many central banks during the recent global financial 
turbulence. There have been several recent attempts to introduce financial stability into the 
monetary policy analysis and we discuss some of them briefly. 
Williamson (1987) constructs a business cycle model in which financial intermediation is a 
determinant of business cycle fluctuations, and banks exist because of asymmetric information 
and costly monitoring. Stochastic disturbances to the riskiness of investment projects produce 
equilibrium business cycles in the presence of monitoring costs: cycles are produced through 
costly intermediation rather than firms’ failures. There are two mechanisms through which real 
output fluctuates: (i) intertemporal substitution, common to many real business cycle models; (ii) 
a credit supply effect: a reduction in the amount of loans in the current period reduces the next 
period’s output. The general idea of the paper is close to ours, but the model does not incorporate 
nominal rigidities (sticky prices), and does not consider the role of monetary policy in smoothing 
fluctuations in the cycle.  Monetary Policy Rules with Financial Instability   5 
 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) develop a new Keynesian model that includes a partial 
equilibrium model of the credit market in order to study how credit market frictions amplify real 
and nominal shocks to the economy. Banks act as intermediaries between households/depositors, 
and entrepreneurs, who need loans to produce a homogeneous good. Endogenous developments in 
credit markets—due to the presence of asymmetric information and agency costs—propagate and 
amplify shocks to the economy. The model does not incorporate, however, a concept of financial 
instability, and banks are able to diversify idiosyncratic shocks completely; thus, the ex ante and 
ex post deposit rates are identical.  
Brousseau and Detken (2001) exploit a sunspot equilibrium in a standard new Keynesian 
framework. In their model, the central bank may choose not to keep inflation at target in the short 
term in order to stabilize the financial system. They interpret the sunspot shock as financial 
instability. The authors do not provide an explicit modeling of the financial sector or a description 
of the process by which financial instability affects the rest of the economy. In fact, the sunspot 
shock does not influence the vector of endogenous variables and the shock brings indeterminacy 
to the otherwise standard model. The model does not consider the use of a Taylor rule by the 
central bank but, instead, discusses the specification of the optimal policy with respect to the one 
arising from the standard model. 
Detken and Smets (2004) derive some stylized facts for financial, real, and monetary policy 
developments during asset price booms for European countries, providing an extensive overview 
of the literature on macro-monetary-finance interactions. The paper does not derive a model with 
financial instability, but it contains a useful discussion of a variety of relevant practical aspects of 
monetary policy conduct under asset price booms.  
Berger, Kißmer, and Wagner (2007) explore how optimal monetary policy is affected by shocks 
to asset prices when these assets serve as the collateral base for private-sector debt accumulation. 
The authors argue that—under forward-looking private expectations and public knowledge of the 
possibility of a future credit crunch—a pre-emptive monetary policy to the build-up of the crisis 
scenario is superior in welfare terms to a reactive monetary policy, in part because the public will 
expect such policy.  
Finally, de Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008) show, using German bank and macro data between 
1995 and 2004 that a monetary contraction increases the mean probability of bank distress and 
vice versa. This nexus is found to be weaker for economically most significant distress events, 
that is, when monetary policy itself cannot offset negative developments, and at times when bank 
capitalization is low. 
2.2 Evidence on Financial Instability and Central Banks 
Whether financial sector concerns should influence monetary policy decisions has remained a 
controversial issue. Economists such as Schwartz (1995) argued that by pursuing the goal of price 
stability, central banks would promote financial stability the best, and information about the 
financial system is useful only to the extent that it can be used to improve the inflation forecast. 
However, others argued that financial systems are inherently fragile and central banks need to 
intervene when financial institutions are under stress. According to this view, restricting monetary 
policy to price stability considerations alone is incorrect and policymaking would be improved by 
incorporating financial sector concerns explicitly in the rule (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; 6   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
Cecchetti and others, 2000). These interventions can be proactive (“pricking the bubbles”) or 
reactive (“cleaning up the mess,” that is adjusting the monetary stance in response to observed 
unfavorable financial sector developments).
3 
Central banks may also react to financial sector problems for reasons unconnected to monetary 
policy. Some central banks have a role supervising banks or other financial institutions and may 
be perceived to be responsible for the soundness of these institutions, and for smooth functioning 
of the payment and settlements systems. Owing to regulatory and supervisory agencies’ lack of 
independence, regulatory and monetary policy objectives may become intertwined, with the latter 
being subordinated to the former (Quintyn, Ramirez, and Taylor, 2007).  
A host of recent empirical studies have found that central banks do react to financial sector 
instability, but that their reaction is asymmetric, nonlinear, and reflects the nature of the 
underlying shock. Surprisingly, empirical results and anecdotal evidence on the link between 
financial instability and monetary policy have been largely ignored in theoretical papers. 
Borio and Lowe (2004) estimate modified Taylor rule functions for Australia, Germany, Japan, 
and the United States, concluding that central banks either do not respond much to financial 
imbalances (measured as credit and equity-price gaps) or, to the extent that they do, respond 
asymmetrically and reactively (not proactively).  
Cecchetti and Li (2005) find that policymakers react to the state of their banking system’s balance 
sheet, attempting to counteract or even neutralize the procyclical effect of capital regulation. The 
resulting disintermediation has a procyclical effect. The authors conclude that for a given level of 
economic activity and inflation, the optimal policy reaction is to set interest rates lower the more 
financial stress there is in the banking system when the economic activity is in the downturn. 
Their results assume that: (i) central bank reaction is conditioned on the business cycle only; and 
(ii) the capital adequacy requirement is an unlikely candidate as a financial instability measure. 
Bulíř and Čihák (2008) estimate a modified Taylor rule in a panel of 28 industrial and emerging 
market countries using seven different measures of financial instability, finding that instability has 
been associated with short-term interest rates below those implied by the simple rule. Moreover, 
the response of monetary policy to domestic financial sector vulnerability is stronger in 
economies that are closed or have banking supervision inside the central bank. Quantitatively, in a 
country with a floating exchange rate, the contemporaneous impact of a one standard deviation 
increase in the probability of crisis is associated with interest rates being 0.2 percentage points 
lower than what they would be otherwise.  
3. The Model 
Our model, which builds on Galí (2002), addresses two simplifications in the standard new 
Keynesian DSGE model: the omission of a financial system and the omission of forward-looking 
variables in the policy rule. We differ from a Galí-type DSGE model in two respects: (i) financial 
intermediaries supply external financing to some firms; and (ii) firms that are sensitive to the 
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supply of loans and the interest rate are linked with the rest of the firms in the economy through a 
productivity nexus. 
These innovations capture stylized facts that have been absent from the typical DSGE model used 
in the literature:
4 (i) the credit channel works through a subset of firms that depend on external 
financing; (ii) small- and medium-sized firms depend on banks for financing more than large 
firms; (iii) small, start-up firms perish easily if they cannot obtain external financing; (iv) small 
firms are driving technology and productivity improvements; (v) higher lending rates make both 
the marginal loan and the lending portfolio of the financial system more risky; (vi) the central 
bank observes changes in financial system health before the public does; and (vii) monetary 
policy actions have a limited impact on moral hazard in banks.  
The economy contains five types of agents: households; goods-producing firms that are 
monopolistic competitors; innovative firms that are freely competitive; financial intermediaries, 
which are freely competitive as well; and a central bank. While we describe them in turn below, 
further details of the derivations are provided in the Appendix. 
3.1 Households 
The economy is populated with a continuum of infinitely-lived and identical households that 
derive utility from consumption of goods and leisure, and invest their savings in a financial 
intermediary that pays a nominal rate  t r  for one-period deposits made at time t-1. Households 
consume a basket of all goods available according to 
1 1 1
0




− − ⎡ ⎤
= ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∫ , 
where  c is the contemporaneous consumption of the representative household andε  is the 
elasticity of substitution between any two given goods indexed i and i’. 
The problem of the representative household can be written as 
,
0





EU c n β
∞
= ∑ , 
subject to its period-by-period budget constraint (in nominal terms) 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t T P P d P r n w P d P c P + Π + + = + − − 1 1 , where  t d are deposits,  t w  is the wage rate,  t n  is 
labor,  t Π  are dividends, and  t T  are lump sum taxes; all these variables are in real terms. 
3.2 Goods Firms (“Firms That Do Not Need External Financing”) 
The first segment of the corporate sector is a continuum of infinitely-lived firms acting as 
monopolistic competitors. These firms produce a single perishable, differentiated good with a 
technology  ) ( ) ( j n a j y t t t = , where  t a  is a technology shifter common to all firms. The 
economy-wide, competitive factor market guarantees that all firms pay the same nominal wage 
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t t t w P W =  for a unit of labor employed. The distinguishing feature of these firms is that they do 
not need to borrow from financial intermediaries, and are able to finance themselves through 
retained earnings. We imagine that these firms are “large”. 
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that these firms adjust their prices infrequently and that the 
opportunity to adjust prices follows an exogenous Poisson process. Each period there is a constant 
probability  θ − 1  that the firm will be able to adjust its price, independently of past history. 
Inability to adjust prices every period is the source of nominal rigidities that make inflation 
distortionary. 
3.3 Innovative Firms (“Firms That Need External Financing”) 
The non-financial corporate sector contains also firms that have to borrow from financial 
intermediaries to develop a project. These firms only live for two periods and operate under 
perfect competition. The key distinguishing feature of these firms is that, unlike the goods firms, 
they are dependent on external financing. We imagine that these firms are “small,” at least relative 
to the goods firms. In period t such a firm invests in a project in order to obtain a return in period 
t+1. The technology is such that  
                                                      ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 j s j j s t t χ = + .                                                 (1) 
where  ) ( j st  is the initial investment made by firm j in the project and  ) ( j χ  is the firm-specific 
return of the project. 
Some of these firms survive and some do not. For simplicity, we assume that a constant fraction γ 
of these firms born in period t survive with probability one in period t+1. Moreover, to capture the 
trade-off between risk and return, we assume that firms that survive with probability one, i.e., 
“risk-free” firms, are the least profitable firms. The remaining firms may die at the beginning of 
period t+1 with probability  1 + t δ , where  1 + t δ  is stochastic. A firm that does not survive obtains a 
zero return for its project. Finally,  1 + t δ  is realized only at the beginning of period t+1, after firms 
have applied for and received loans. 
The returns of innovative firms are nonstochastic, firm-specific, and distributed according to a 
log-normal distribution with parameters µ  andσ . We index firms according to their returns in 
the interval [0,  1], denoting with 0 the firm for which 
min ) ( χ χ = j  and with 1 the firm for 
which
max ) ( χ χ = j . We establish a one-to-one correspondence between the firm’s index and the 
lognormal cumulative distribution function. That is, firm j is such that a proportion j of firms 
obtain returns which are lower than  ) ( j χ . Then γ  is both the proportion of firms that survive 
with probability one next period and the most profitable non-risky firm. Figure 1 shows a stylized 
distribution of returns with parameters  05 . 0 = µ ,  1 . 0 = σ , and  2 . 0 = γ . Firms that obtain returns 
higher than  9664 . 0 ) ( = γ χ  are risky, in the sense that they may die next period with 
probability 1 + t δ . On the contrary, firms with returns lower than 9664 . 0 ) ( = γ χ survive with 
probability one. In Section 4 we will show results under different assumptions aboutγ . 
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3.4 Financial Intermediaries 
The economy also contains a continuum of risk-neutral financial intermediaries that act as 
go-betweens for households and innovative firms. As there is free entry in the financial sector, 
banks obtain zero profits in equilibrium. These institutions receive deposits from households in 
period t and lend to innovative firms, charging for them a lending rate t z . At time t+1 firms that 
have survived repay their loans and intermediaries pay to households the return rt+1. For 
simplicity, we assume zero recovery on loans to failed firms. We will assume that intermediaries 
are able to monitor whether a firm exists or not without a cost, but cannot distinguish between 
firms and thus charge the same loan rate  t z  to all firms. However, a firm j has an incentive to ask 
for a loan only if its expected project return is higher than the lending rate. In other words, there is 
no moral hazard problem in the model.
5 
                                                              t z j > ) ( χ .                                                        (2) 
We assume that  t zt ∀ <     
max χ . Therefore, the marginal firm  t ω  to ask for a loan will be such 
that  t t z = ) (ω χ . In Figure 1, the marginal-firm cutoff point  t ω  can be interpreted as the 
proportion of innovative firms that have returns lower than  t z  and, therefore, do not find it 
profitable to apply for a loan. Thus, due to the lack of funds, these firms will not be producing in 
period t+1. Conversely, the proportion of firms asking for loans will be ( t ω − 1 ). 
                                                           
5 Introducing moral hazard would complicate the algebra, without changing the results substantially. Given that 
lower rates reduce incentives for moral hazard (and thereby reduce risks in lending), the introduction of moral 
hazard would somewhat strengthen the case for lowering interest rates in situations of increased financial 
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In this economy riskiness and the lending rate are positively related, in line with the existing 
literature (Ruckes, 2004).
6 Given the technology of innovative firms, they have an infinite demand 
for loans, and since banks cannot distinguish among borrowers, they will divide their loanable 
resources (household deposits) into equal parts, providing the same amount of loans to each firm 









. Thus, the riskiness of the whole loan portfolio is increasing (more 
precisely, non-decreasing) in the lending rate. At higher rates fewer firms apply for a loan and the 
lending portfolio becomes more concentrated in the high-return and high-risk segment and thus 
more risky overall.
7  
Intermediaries’ opportunity cost of a loan is a central bank bill that pays a nominal interest rate 
equal to t i  (policy rate) and that is for all practical purposes equivalent to short-term treasury bills. 
Then it has to be the case that the return on lending to firms is equal to the return on investing in 
the central bank paper and the loan rate will be determined as the rate such that the expected 
returns from loans are equal to the interest rate t i . 
 
                                                           )
~
( 1 + = t t t t t l z E d i ,                                                       (3) 
where  1
~
+ t l  are loans actually repaid in period t+1. Notice that, since banks do not know the 
probability of firm survival when they lend to them, they compute the loan rate based on their 
expectations of the  1 + t δ  shock. The ex post deposit rate will thus be  t t t t d l z r /
~
1 1 + + = . In other 
words, if a smaller proportion of loans are repaid in t+1, the (ex post) deposit rate becomes 
smaller, which means an increase in the spread between the deposit rate on the one hand and the 
policy rate and the lending rate on the other hand. 
3.5 Technology 
The economy-wide total technology  t a  consists of two components. One component is 










t ε  is 
an independent and identically-distributed (i.i.d.) shock and 
s
t a )
denotes log-deviations of 
s
t a  from 
steady state.  
The other, additional components of technology are the projects developed by the innovative 
firms that asked for loans in period t-1 and survived in period t. The production function for this 

























t , where  1 ) (
* = j t δ  if the firm survived in 
period t and zero otherwise, and τ  is the elasticity of substitution between any two projects j and 
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Finally, total technology combines both the exogenous and endogenous components according to 






t t a a a , where α  is the contribution of technology generated by 
innovative firms, 
i
t a , to total technology. Thus, without innovative firms, productivity growth 
would be limited to the exogenous component only. 
3.6 The Central Bank 
The central bank seeks to stabilize the economy, which means that it responds to the productivity 
and survival shocks that hit the two types of firms (
s
t a  and t δ , respectively). We examine two 
central bank response functions, with and without regard for the state of the financial system.  
First, we look at a central bank that set its policy rate as per the traditional Taylor rule,  
                                                          tt x t ix π φ πφ =+
) )
                                                    (4) 
where  t i  is the policy rate,  t π )
 is inflation in period t and  t x is the output gap, defined as the 
difference between actual output and natural output (that is, output in the flexible price 
allocation). In order to guarantee a unique equilibrium, the rule needs to be such that  π φ >1. While 
this is a backward-looking rule, we test its robustness against a forward-looking rule that contains 
expected inflation (in t+1) instead of the current inflation (in t). While the latter rule is closer to 
the modeling practice in modern central banks, the resulting paths of inflation and output are 
fairly similar. 
Second, we look at a central bank that continually monitors financial intermediaries and their 
counterparts to infer the state of the economy and the impact of financial institutions’ health on 
the real economy. This information is likely to be collected through prudential supervision of 
financial intermediaries (if the central bank has prudential powers), or through the central bank’s 
role in the payment system. This information is confidential, that is, exclusive to the central bank 
on the systemic level. 
Empirical studies suggest that if central banks have recent supervisory information from on-site 
visits, they can achieve better predictions of financial stability than is possible based on publicly 
available data.
8 If the central bank has this information, it can presumably use it to improve the 
stabilization outcome of its policies. On the one hand, with no systemic risk, the usual Taylor rule 
would apply. On the other hand, with sizable systemic risk and low chances of survival for 
borrowing firms, the central bank would employ its private information on the probability of 
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default,  t δ , at the beginning of period t, possibly augmenting its rule-based decision with this 
information. The policy response function would look as follows:     









otherwise ) )( ( ˆ
0 ) (   if                   ˆ ˆ
1 1
1 1
t t t t x t




δ δ ν φ φ π φ
δ δ φ π φ
δ
δ π
π     (5) 
where  0 < δ φ and 
δ ν is a shock to the sensitivity of the rule to movements in the probability of 
default,  t δ , capturing both the reporting lags and the policymaker’s nonlinear and asymmetric 
response to these movements. The term 
δ ν also guarantees that private agents cannot infer  t δ  
from the interest rate set by the central bank, estimating  π φ ,  x φ and  δ φ  based on observations of 
the policy interest rate. In other words, we impose a limit on signal extraction by central bank 
observers.
9 This is realistic, because the sort of financial instability we are interested is a 
fundamentally new shock affecting in the economy, not something that can easily be predicted 
based on past developments. Indeed, if economic agents knew the value of t δ , the scope for loose 
monetary policy to “inflate away” a negative shock to financial stability would disappear. 
The timing of events will be as follows: at the beginning of every period, after  t δ  and 
s
t a  are 
realized, total technology  t a  is observed. Households make their decisions on consumption, 
saving, and labor allocations, forming their expectations based on the information they possess at 
the time. The central bank sets the policy rate according to the rule (4) in the benchmark scenario; 
while it employs the augmented rule (5) in the alternative scenarios, using also different values of 
this information in the rule ( δ φ ). Therefore, in (5) the central bank uses information that other 
agents do not possess, and we want to study whether this informational advantage is relevant for 
the determination of the policy rate or not. 
In what follows, we will calibrate the model and observe the effects of two shocks on the 
economy: (i) a pure technological shock; and (ii) a shock to the probability of default of firms. We 
will study two different scenarios for central bank response. First, the benchmark (“Traditional 
Taylor Rule”), in which the central bank response is characterized by the Taylor rule defined as in 
(4), with the parameter values  π φ =1.5 and  x φ =0.5 used in Taylor (1993) and many of the 
subsequent papers. Second, we will examine an “Augmented Taylor Rule” scenario, in which the 
policy rule is as in (5) with  5 . 0 − = δ φ . This parameterization of  δ φ  is somewhat arbitrary, but the 
results do not differ qualitatively if we use, for example  25 . 0 − = δ φ  or  75 . 0 − = δ φ . What 
matters from a qualitative standpoint is that  0 < δ φ . 
4. Model Simulations 
We calibrate the model and observe the effects of two shocks: a pure technological shock and a 
shock to the probability of default of firms. The time period is one quarter. 
                                                           
9 One could also think that the central bank cannot perfectly foresee  t δ and that it only receives more 
information to compute the conditional expectation than the rest of the agents. Nevertheless, under this 
specification the qualitative implications of our setup remain unchanged. Monetary Policy Rules with Financial Instability   13 
 
4.1 Parameterization 
We calibrate the model using parameter values from Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998) and 















n c U  with  1 = =ϕ σ . The probability of adjusting prices in a 
given period  θ − 1  is set equal to 0.25, which implies an average price duration of one year, a 
value in line with survey evidence. The discount rate β  is set to be 0.99. The serial correlation for 
the technology process, 
a ρ , is assumed to be 0.95.  
The process for the probability of small-firm survival is 
δ δ ε δ ρ δ δ t t t + + = −1 , where 
δ εt  is an 
i.i.d. process. Given the average duration of post-war U.S. recessions of 11 months, we choose 
δ ρ  to be 0.25, and the annual rate of business failure, δ , is equal to 0.03, approximating the data. 
The share of firms that survive for sure,γ , is set to be 0.2, which implies a quarterly steady-state 
spread between loan and deposit rates of 0.76 percent and an annual loan rate of 7.28 percent.  
The variances of the technological shock and probability-of-survival shocks,
a σ  and 
δ σ , are 
assumed to be 0.01 and 0.0025, respectively. The last two parameters, the participation of 
i
t a  in 
the creation of technology and the elasticity of substitution between any two projects j and j’, are 
set to equal  05 . 0 = α  andτ  = 4/3, respectively. That is, we are assigning a comparatively small 
role of 
i
t a  in the creation of total technology, but—based on U.S. data—we expect sizeable 
effects from shocks to the probability of default. 
To assess the robustness of the results, we have calculated our simulations for a range of different 
distributions of returns to innovative firms. The results do not vary substantially. For exposition 
purposes, we choose a lognormal distribution with  05 . 0 = µ  and  1 . 0 = σ . 
4.2 Simulation Results 
An Exogenous Technology Shock 
First, we simulate an exogenous technology shock, that is, a positive shock in 
s
t a  equal to one 
standard deviation thereof (
a ε ). Figure 2 shows the trajectory of the shock. Figure 3 shows the 
response of output, the output gap, inflation, and labor. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the main 
interest rates (policy rate, deposit rate, loan rate, and effective (ex post) deposit rate). Figure 5 
shows the evolution of loan applications ( 1 − t ω ) and endogenous and total technology. Both in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 we compare the results from our model (with both specifications of the 
Taylor rule given in equations (4) and (5)) with what is obtained in a standard model without the 
innovative sector. This last case has been studied in the literature, and will serve as a benchmark 
for comparison purposes. In Figure 5, we do not show results for the benchmark model since the 
variables graphed do not appear in such a framework.   
A positive exogenous technology shock in an economy with sticky prices, imperfect competition, 
and no innovative sector generates lower employment, higher output, and opening of the output 
gap, as depicted by the alternating dashed green line in Figure 3. While all firms experience a 
decrease in their marginal costs, not all can adjust their prices in this period (Galí, 2001).Thus, the 14   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
consequent changes in the aggregate price level and demand will be proportionately less than the 
initial increase in productivity.  
Figure 2: Shock to Exogenous Technology  
(One standard deviation of the technology shock, 
a ε ) 
 
In the above economy, the responses of the variables to an exogenous technology shock are both 
different from the simple benchmark model and more pronounced. Despite the differences 
explained below, from period 2 on the qualitative response of all variables is identical in all three 
scenarios. The response of labor and the output gap in the first period is positive, becoming 
negative only from the second period onwards. This result follows from the initial monetary 
loosening based on the central bank’s private information. The path of the variables is not as 
smooth as before, and for some variables such as labor and the output gap the response is not even 
monotonic. This result follows from the impact of the lending conditions on the evolution of 
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Figure 3: Shock to Exogenous Technology: Response of Output, Output Gap, Inflation, and 
Labor (One standard deviation of the technology shock, 




 16   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
Figure 4: Shock to Exogenous Technology: Response of Policy Rate, Real Interest Rate, Loan 
Rate, and Effective Deposit Rate (One standard deviation of the technology shock,
a ε ) 
 
Figure 5: Shock to Exogenous Technology: Response of  t ω  , Endogenous Technology and 
Total Technology (One standard deviation of the technology shock, 
a ε ) 
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. From this expression, we can observe that the 
creation of endogenous technology in period t depends on the proportion of firms applying for a 
loan  1 − t ω  and deposits  1 − t d . The higher the level of deposits, the higher the amount of the loan 
received by each firm and, consequently, the higher the contribution of technology generated by 
innovative firms, 
i
t a . The effect of  1 − t ω  on 
i
t a  is a priori indeterminate: while a lower  1 − t ω implies 
that more firms are obtaining loans and thus the term in brackets increases, the total amount of 









More specifically, the decrease in the policy rate due to the negative response of inflation causes 
loan applications to decrease, whereas deposits increase because of the better expectations on 
future consumption (see (A14) in the appendix). The full impact on endogenous technology is 
positive, but the effect only takes place in period 2. This translates into a higher expectation of 
output (and consequently, consumption) for period 2, which causes period 1 consumption to 
increase more than what is accounted for by the period 1 increase in exogenous technology. Thus, 
labor increases, causing the output gap to increase as well (A6). From period 2 onward the higher 
level of endogenous technology is added to the original effect of the exogenous technology shock, 
which explains the amplified response of all variables to the shock.  
As the technology shock dies out, loan applications, t ω , increase and deposits,  1 − t d , decrease until 
they reach their steady state values. Nevertheless, the path of 
i
t a  is not monotonic: while the 
overall trend is downward sloping, in some periods it increases with respect to its value in the 
previous period. This is so because the process for 
i
t a  has no memory (there is no transmission 
from 
i
t a 1 −  to 
i
t a  as innovative firms live for two periods only) and the effect of  1 − t ω  on 
i
t a  is 
indeterminate a priori.  
The economy with the innovative sector behaves much in the same way under both rules 
proposed. This is due to the fact that a technology shock does not generate financial instability: 
∀ = −     0 t t t E δ δ t and thus the reaction of the central bank to the shock will be identical under all 
scenarios. For the case with no contribution to technology generated by the innovative 
sector, 0 = α , our model nests the benchmark model without the innovative sector. Deviating 
from the benchmark scenario by setting  05 . 0 = α , the model departs from the standard results, as 
can be seen in the differences between the dashed red and solid blue lines in Figures 3 to 5, due to 
a small difference in the numerical solution of the model under the two specifications. These 
differences are, nonetheless, of a very small magnitude and do not alter the thrust of the results. 
A Shock to the Default Probability 
Second, we consider a negative shock to the probability of survival ( t δ ) of one standard deviation 
(
δ ε ) (Figure 6). Unlike the long-lasting technology shock, this shock is assumed to be much less 
persistent than the previous shock, dying out in approximately 4 quarters. The economy is 
described in Figures 7 to 9 (note that in all three figures, time on the horizontal axis is shown in 
years, i.e. t=1 corresponds to 4 quarters since the shock). 18   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
Figure 6: Shock to Probability of Default (One standard deviation of the shock to the default    
probability,
δ ε ) 
 
Figure 7: Shock to Probability of Default: Response of Output, Output Gap, Inflation, and 
Labor (One standard deviation of the shock to the default probability, 
δ ε ) 
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Since the two specifications of the Taylor rule that we consider generate very different dynamics 
for the variables of interest, we will first describe their evolution when the central bank sets the 
policy rate according to the traditional Taylor rule (4). The benchmark model does not have an 
innovative sector and thus no simulations for this shock can be generated. 
The negative default shock in period 0 results in a decline in output in period 1 (Figure 7). The 
shock translates into fewer firms surviving the next period and, consequently, less generation of 
endogenous technology in period 1 (Figure 10), and, as a result, output in period 1 decreases. 
Following the same logic as in the previous case, inflation increases and aggregate demand 
decreases less than the fall in the natural level of output (thus, the output gap is negative). Again, 
the presence of the innovative shock alters significantly the responses in the first period from the 
ones in period 2 onwards. In period 1, the negative performance of current and future output 
impacts negatively on deposits. In addition to this, the higher default rate causes  1 ω  to increase. 
These two elements depress further the creation of endogenous technology in period 2, causing 
labor (and, consequently, the output gap) to increase even above its steady state level. From 
period 2 onwards, the variables behave similarly to what is obtained in the benchmark model for a 
negative technology shock.  
We observe that when the central bank follows a simple Taylor rule, it fails to react in period 1 to 
the next-period shock to the probability of survival,  2 δ , even though it possesses this information 
(Figure 8). The central bank reacts only from period 2 onwards, when the shock has already 
affected the economy, widening the output gap and increasing inflation. At this point, the rule 
dictates that the central bank increase the policy rate, inducing a decline in aggregate demand and 
thus softening the effects of the shock. 
What would happen if the central bank adjusted the policy before the shock affected total 
technology according to the augmented rule (5)? Given that the central bank knows  2 δ  in 
period 1, foreseeing the negative effects on the economy caused by a higher default rate, it can 
decrease the policy rate in period 1, in turn lowering the loan rate (Figure 8). The change in the 
expected deposit rate mimics the change in the policy rate, thus stimulating aggregate demand. 
Moreover, the decrease in the policy rate implies a lower cutoff point for the first-period marginal 
firm,  1 ω , and it generates positive expectations over future activity and stimulates deposits. These 
two elements have a positive effect over endogenous technology in period 2, more than offsetting 
the negative effect of  2 δ . The deposit and loan rates follow the evolution of the policy rate by 
decreasing in period 1 and increasing gradually in subsequent periods (Figure 8). Figure 9 
illustrates the impact that this alternative policy rate response has on the spread between loan and 
deposit rates: under both the Taylor rule and the “augmented” Taylor rule, the spread goes up in 
the initial after-shock period and tapers off thereafter. Under the augmented rule, however, the 
increase in the spread is slightly lower than it would be under the simple Taylor rule.  
Our simulations suggest that a central bank responding to financial sector instability 
(approximated here as an unexpected increase in the probability of default) is able to trade off 
higher initial inflation for more stable output and inflation later on. Under the traditional Taylor 
rule, the cost of ignoring information about δ is more pronounced, resulting in a longer-lasting 
output decline and higher inflation. Of course, monetary policy is useful in reacting to financial 
stability shocks only to the extent private agents’ signal extraction is limited—only the central 
bank has information on  1 + t δ  at the beginning of period t.  20   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
Figure 8: Shock to Probability of Default: Response of Policy Rate, Real Interest Rate, Loan 
Rate, and Effective Deposit Rate (One standard deviation of the shock to the default 
probability, 
δ ε ) 
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Figure 10: Shock to Probability of Default: Response of  t ω  , Endogenous Technology, and 
Total Technology (One standard deviation of the technology shock, 




4.3 Welfare Calculations 
Despite the observable result of more stable output under the augmented Taylor rule, it does not 
translate into sizable welfare gains. Large sensitivity of the policymaker to financial distress in the 
augmented rule results in welfare losses relative to the traditional rules, while smaller sensitivity 
results in welfare gains. However, the gains/losses are barely noticeable. To this end we used the 
traditional measure of welfare losses used in the real business cycle literature—the variance of 
consumption—introduced by Lucas (1987). To assess the robustness of our results, we also 
carried out welfare calculations using a quadratic loss function (Section 5). 
To carry out the Lucas welfare comparison, we calculated the welfare differential as ½ times the 
risk aversion coefficient (σ) times the difference in the variance of the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) consumption. The intuition behind the welfare comparison is that we want to 
assess how much trend consumption the household would give up in order to receive a smoother 
trajectory of output and inflation under the augmented rule. This simulation was evaluated over 
300 periods (exposing technology and the default probability to simultaneous shocks every 
period), and the whole procedure was repeated 100 times. 
The results are robust with respect to the weight of financial instability in the policy rule() δ φ . For 
example, assuming the benchmark value,  δ φ  = –0.5, the standard deviations of consumption 
under the traditional and augmented rules are 0.05915 and 0.05947, respectively. Whereas the 
welfare losses under the augmented rule are marginally higher than under the traditional rule, this 
difference is barely noticeable. Similarly, for a less aggressive rule,  δ φ  = –0.1, the standard 22   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
deviations are 0.05899 and 0.05892, respectively. The long-term effects of the augmented Taylor 
rule can thus be either welfare enhancing or welfare worsening depending on the parameterization 
of the rule. The economy stabilizes faster under the augmented Taylor rule, but the output and 
consumption paths are more volatile initially than under the traditional rule. Indeed, in Figure 7, 
we observe much larger initial, two-period departures from the trend in both the output and output 
gap simulations under the augmented rule than under the traditional rule. In other words, the 
central bank trades off more instability today for a faster return to the trend path tomorrow. 
Introduction of the financial sector and shocks thereto in the DSGE model does not change the 
nature of monetary policy; it only brings forward the eventual policy reaction. 
5. Robustness Checks 
We performed a series of robustness checks to assess what happens to the main results if we alter 
some of our key assumptions. Specifically, we assessed robustness with respect to (i) the size and 
persistency of the default probability shock; (ii) the welfare function; and (iii) the benchmark 
specification of the Taylor Rule. 
As the first robustness check, we increased the standard deviation of the default probability shock 
(from 0.0025 to 0.005) and increased its persistency (from  25 . 0 =
δ ρ  to  5 . 0 =
δ ρ ). Predictably, 
larger and more persistent shocks result in more output and inflation fluctuations and a more 
pronounced policy response, however, the impact is broadly linear. The charts of the impulse 
response functions are available upon request. 
Second, to test the robustness of our welfare calculations, we replaced the Lucas measure by the 
often-used quadratic loss function:  
                        




T t π π −  is the difference between the log of inflation and its steady state value (defined to 
be equal to 0), and 
*
T t t y y x − =  is the output gap (in logs). The parameter α  characterizes the 
relative weights of inflation and output in the loss function.  
Assuming that the central bank is mostly concerned about inflation, we set α =0.75 (for the 
motivation, see Kotlán and Navrátil, 2003), our simulations yield a mean welfare loss of 0.01881 
for the traditional Taylor rule and of 0.03765 for the augmented Taylor rule in the baseline 
calibration. The quadratic loss function calculation penalizes departures from the inflation and 
output trends more than that of Lucas, where only the impact of these departures on consumption 
matters, and we find that the traditional rule is preferable in the long run to the augmented rule. As 
before, we simulated the economy 100 times for a time span of 300 periods (applying shocks to 
technology and the default probability contemporaneously in every period). We computed the 
welfare loss each of the 100 times, and then computed the mean of the losses 
Third, we replaced the backward-looking Taylor rule (with the actual inflation rate in period t) by 
a forward-looking rule (with an expectation of the inflation rate in period t+1). The rule can be 
written as: 
                                           t x t t t x E i φ π φπ + = +1 ˆ ˆ . (4’) Monetary Policy Rules with Financial Instability   23 
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Evaluating both versions of the rule using the quadratic loss function (6), we obtain the following 
mean losses for the traditional and augmented rule: 0.02453 and 0.02387, respectively. This result 
suggests that the augmented rule generates marginally smaller welfare losses in a forward-looking 
framework. We note, however, that these differences are too small to declare the augmented rule 
as the rule of choice. 
6. Practical Issues and Possible Extensions 
Our model uses a specific definition of financial instability, namely, the presence of unexpected 
negative shocks to the probability of default among banks’ borrowers,  t δ . The literature provides 
a wide range of possible definitions of financial stability, none of which has yet become generally 
agreed (Čihák, 2006). Nonetheless, deterioration in the financial health of banks’ borrowers is an 
important proxy for (and early warning indicator of) deterioration in banking sector soundness 
(e.g., International Monetary Fund, 2003).
10 It is therefore also a natural starting point for 
analyzing the central bank response to financial instability, while explicitly modeling the linkages 
between banks and non-banks in the economy. 
In practice, the central bank response to changes in the probability of default is likely to be non-
linear. For example, in their reports on financial stability, central banks claim to focus much more 
on large shocks with systemic implications than on small idiosyncratic shocks with no or limited 
systemic implications (Čihák, 2006). One straightforward way of incorporating this non-linearity 
into the model is to adjust (5) by changing the condition  0 ) ( 1 1 < − + + t t t E δ δ  to 
δ δ δ < − + + ) ( 1 1 t t t E , where  0 > δ  would be some arbitrary threshold used by the central bank to 
distinguish systemic from nonsystemic  t δ  fluctuations. This extension does not change the 
findings of our model as long as the shock to financial stability is systemic, i.e., larger than the 
threshold. 
Another straightforward—and empirically appealing—extension of our approach is interest rate 
smoothing. Specifically, instead of the simple rule in (4) with inflation and output gaps only, one 
would incorporate interest rate smoothing, whereby policy rate adjustments are effected not 
immediately, but over a period of time. There are two reasons why we refrained from 
incorporating interest rate smoothing. First, such behavior is difficult to derive for optimizing 
agents in the DSGE framework. Second, a rule with smoothing would actually tilt the comparison 
even more in favor of the augmented rule (5): the pattern of inflation and output under the 
augmented rule is due to a faster response in policy rates to financial instability shocks as 
                                                           
10 We do not explicitly analyze financial instability generated inside the financial system, because banking sector 
distress can usually be traced back to the health of the banks’ credit portfolios, and thereby to the financial health 
of the banks’ borrowers. Nonetheless, some banks may get into distress even if their borrowers are healthy. 
Adding banking-sector specific instability to the model would strengthen the case for lowering interest rates, 
because lower interest rates tend to prop up banks’ balance sheets (through repricing and other balance sheet 
effects). 24   Sofía Bauducco, Aleš Bulíř and Martin Čihák 
 
compared to the simple rule. Given that smoothing implies—ceteris paribus—slower responses to 
shocks, it would result in an even less favorable response to financial instability shocks under the 
simple rule.  
The model can be further enhanced by introducing other sectors, such as the external sector, 
which is connected with domestic sectors through the exchange rate. The scope for monetary 
policy is more limited in a regime either with an exchange rate anchor or with a strong exchange 
rate transmission channel of monetary policy. Even a small monetary easing may cause a run on 
the currency and force an unwinding of external positions in banks. One can expect less 
enthusiasm for a monetary easing in the face of financial instability in countries with volatile 
capital flows. 
The model can also be extended by allowing the innovative firms to hire labor. This would imply 
that income from work for the innovative firms enters into consumers’ budget constraints. Letting 
innovative firms directly influence employment (not only by their influence on productivity in the 
productive sector) would also make the central bank more interested in stabilization of the 
innovative sector, strengthening the case for a monetary policy response to financial instability.  
The presented model focuses on monetary policy reasons for reactions to financial instability. In 
other words, the analysis is guided by the impact of the central bank response on developments in 
future inflation and output. Many central banks also have a role in prudential supervision, and 
may be perceived responsible for the soundness of the supervised institutions, including ensuring 
the smooth functioning of the payment and settlement systems. This may create an additional 
incentive for central banks to lower interest rates to alleviate financial instability. Such central 
banks also have at their disposal more direct measures of a regulatory or supervisory nature, such 
as limits on various financial ratios that have a binding impact on financial institutions.  
An interesting question not directly addressed in our model is the central bank’s policy choice 
regarding the extent to which this privileged information should be revealed to the public. In the 
model, the public can only extract parts of the central bank’s privileged information from the 
policy rates. In principle, a central bank could decide to disclose all the relevant information, and 
the increased market pressure could press the financial sector into behaving more prudently, 
limiting financial distress. Indeed, a number of central banks have tried in recent years to increase 
the amount of information they share about financial sector soundness through financial stability 
reports and other avenues. However, the ability and willingness of central banks to communicate 
privileged supervisory information to the public is limited by either confidentiality laws or 
concerns that sharing information may in some cases trigger the very crisis the central bank is 
trying to prevent.  
 Monetary Policy Rules with Financial Instability   25 
 
7. Conclusions 
Financial instability deserves to be taken seriously because of its macroeconomic costs, but the 
literature on monetary policy response functions has largely ignored its impact on the behavior of 
the central bank, basing the policy rule only on the contemporaneous output gap and inflation. To 
this end, we (i) enrich the standard new Keynesian model with a financial system and firms that 
require external financing, and (ii)  introduce a forward-looking element into the Taylor rule. 
Under the augmented policy rule the central bank monitors the financial system, responding to 
deterioration in the financial system balance sheet with instant monetary loosening. To our best 
knowledge, our paper is the first one to model the central bank response to financial instability in 
a general equilibrium context. 
The setup of the model fits the stylized facts of modern central banking. Namely, we know that 
central banks spend substantial resources on monitoring the economy and financial system, 
collecting information that would allow them to respond rapidly to forthcoming financial 
instability shocks well before these shocks are transmitted into headline inflation, output, or other 
macroeconomic aggregates. The underlying financial shock and its transmission mechanism are 
integrated into the model, rather than being treated as ad hoc factors as in the earlier literature. 
We find that a policy rule, whereby a central bank lowers its policy rate in response to financial 
sector instability, yields different short-term outcomes in terms of output and inflation than the 
traditional Taylor rule. Our model illustrates that as long as the financial instability shock is short-
lived and of reasonable magnitude, a forward-looking central bank can prop up the banking 
system with monetary easing, limiting the short-term fall in the level of output and consumption 
as compared to the traditional Taylor rule. The central bank following the augmented rule trades 
off more output and inflation instability today for a faster return to the trend path tomorrow. The 
long-run welfare impact depends on the parameterization of the model and on the type of the 
welfare function, however, the welfare benefits of the augmented rules appear to be negligible. 
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Appendix 
To derive the equations to solve the model numerically we follow Monacelli (2004). 
Households: 
Households consume a basket of goods according to 
1 1 1
0




− − ⎡ ⎤
= ⎢ ⎥





max   c ( )















where  t X  is total nominal expenditure, and  ) (i P t is the price of good i, we obtain: 




























⎣⎦ ∫  is the aggregate price index. Equation (A1) is the isoelastic demand 
for good i. The optimization problem of households stated in the main text is: 
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σ σ β                                                                                         (A2) 
In log-linear terms, these equations can be written as 
•  t t t w c n ) ) ) = +     σ ϕ  
•  )   ˆ (   1 1 1 + + + − − = − t t t t t c r E c ) ) ) σ π σ  
where variables with hats denote log-deviations from steady state. 
 
Goods firms: 
With sticky prices, the evolution of the aggregate price index can be written as  
                                                [] ε ε θ θ − −
− − + = 1
1
1
1 ) 1 (
new
t t t P P P                                          (A3) 
A firm j that has to decide on the price of its product in period t has to take into account the fact 
that it will be able to reset its price in the future with probability  θ − 1 . Then the problem of such 
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where  ) (i Y k t+  is the nominal production of good I in period t+k and, given that in our model 
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, as the household marginal intertemporal rate of substitution. All variables are 
in nominal terms. 
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Log-linearizing this expression we get 




) 1 )( 1 (
1
− −
+ = +                                   (A4) 
where  1 − − = t t t P P
) ) ) π  is inflation. 
The aggregate production function is 
                                                             t t t n a y =                                                            (A5) 
In log-linear terms 
                                                              t t t n a y ) ) ) + =                                                       (A6) 
Cost-minimization implies the following efficiency condition for the choice of labor 
                                                                  υ t t t a mc w =                                                    (A7) 
 
where υ  is a constant subsidy to employment that exactly offsets the distortion associated with 
monopolistic competition, such that in steady state the economy achieves the efficient allocation. 
Combining this last equation with the first order conditions of households: 
 







= −                                                  (A8) 
Replacing (A6) in (A8) and writing this equation in log-linear terms 
                                                      t t t a y c m ) ) ) ) 1 ( ) ( ϕ ϕ σ + − + =                                        (A9) 
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Flexible-price allocation: 
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where 








From this equation, we can conclude that under flexible prices the real marginal cost will be 
constant and given by 
ε
ε 1 −
. Then in equation (A9),  t c m)
will be 0, so  
                                               t t a y ) ) ) 1 ( ) ( 0
* ϕ ϕ σ + − + =                                  (A10) 






1 *  
This is the natural level of output (expressed as log-deviations from steady state). The star refers 
to the variables in the flexible price allocation. 
Forward-looking Phillips curve: 
Subtracting (A10) from (A9) we obtain 
                                 
* () ( ) () tt tt mc y y x σ ϕσ ϕ =+ − =+ ) ))
                              (A11) 
where xt is the output gap defined as the difference between output and its natural level. 
Substituting equation (A11) in (A4) we obtain the forward-looking Phillips Curve: 
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) )( 1 )( 1 ( + − −
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Computation of  t ω  and  t z : 
First remember that  t t z = ) (ω χ . Next we have to distinguish two cases according to whether the 
marginal firm  t ω  is risky (i.e.,  t ω >γ ) or not ( t ω <γ ).  
•  t ω >γ  
Recall equation (3) in the text:  )
~
( 1 + = t t t t t l z E d i . This means that  ( ) t t t t t t t z l E d i ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 ω δ − − = + , 
and therefore  ) 1 ( ) ( 1 + − = t t t t E i δ ω χ . Then  t ω  can be computed as the cdf of a lognormal 
distribution with parameters µ and σ  for 






•  t ω <γ  
Taking into account that  )
~
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In this case, t ω  needs to be computed by a numerical root-finding algorithm. Let 
A
t z  be the loan 
rate charged when  t ω <γ  and 
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Steady state: 
First notice that in steady state technology  1 1 = ⇒ = = a a a
s i 11. Then  n c y = = .   
From equation (A2) we can see that in steady state 
β
1
= R . From the first condition of the 
household optimization problem, we can conclude that  w y =
+σ ϕ . It can be shown that in order to 





υ  . Also, 
ε
ε 1 −
= mc . From equation (A7) we find then that 
1 1 = = = ⇒ = n c y w . Finally, we assume 1 = P , so the budget constraint of households is 
T d R n w d c − Π + + = + * *  
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We will assume that 
f T  is such that 
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f T . 
Given that in steady state the government has a balanced budget, we know that 
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i  and ω and 
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We will assume that, unlike profits Π, lump-sum taxes to households are constant every period. 
Then substituting in the period-by-period budget constraint of households, we find that deposits in 
steady state are  0
) 1 (











d , because  1    , 0 ) 1 ( > < − ε R . 
 
Computation of deposits: 
Combining the period-by-period budget constraint of households and the Euler equation (A2) we 
can write  
             
t
t
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Iterating forward, using the transversality condition  0 lim 1
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As we have shown before, steady state implies  , 1 = = = W N C  and  0 = Π . Since taxes are 
constant,  0 ˆ = t t . Finally, given our parameterization,  . 1 = σ  The latter expression becomes 
( ) ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t t t t t t d r RD c RD n w c T d r RD c RD E π π β − + + − = + − − + − + + − − + + +  
This can be re-written as  ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( 1 + + + − − = t t t t t t s V E n w c T s V β , where 
) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ( 1 t t t t t d r RD c RD s V π − + + − = − . Imposing the transversality condition, it is easy to see that 
this is a contraction. Then we can solve for  ) ( t s V by value function iteration. Now we need to 
extract  t d ˆ from this expression. Log-linearizing expression (A2) and imposing the conditions of 
steady state as before, we obtain  ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 t t t t t t t d r RD n w d D c π − + + + = + −  
Adding and subtracting  t c RDˆ  from the previous expression we obtain  t d ˆ , 
() ) ( ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ
t t t t t s V c RD n w
D
d + − + + = . 
Equations (A6), (A7) in log-linear terms, (A11) and (A12) are, together with the two first order 
conditions for households, the equations corresponding to the innovative firms and financial 
intermediaries stated in the text and the expression for deposits, the fundamental equations of the 
model. 
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